My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the consequences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a distinctive and novel problem for causal decision theory (CDT). My thesis is that foreknowledge poses no new problems for CDT. Some of the purported problems are not problems. Others are problems, but they are not problems for CDT. Rather, they are problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Others are problems, but they are not new problems. They are old problems transposed into a new key. Nonetheless, decisions made with foreknowledge illustrate important lessons about the instrumental value of our choices. Once we've appreciated these lessons, we are left with a version of CDT which faces no novel threats from foreknowledge.

中文翻译：

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决定和预知

我的主题是当你预知自己选择的后果时如何做出决定。许多人认为这类决策给因果决策理论（CDT）提出了一个独特且新颖的问题。我的论点是，预知不会给 CDT 带来新的问题。有些所谓的问题其实并不是问题。其他的都是问题，但对CDT来说不是问题。相反，它们是我们的虚拟假设理论的问题。其他问题虽然是问题，但并不是新问题。它们是旧问题转化为新的关键。尽管如此，有先见之明的决定说明了我们选择的工具价值的重要教训。一旦我们理解了这些教训，我们就会得到一个 CDT 版本，它不会面临来自预知的新威胁。