Current approaches to voting behavior in clientelist contexts either predict that clients leave their preferences aside for fear of having their benefits cut off or voluntarily support politicians they perceive to be reliable patrons. These two approaches cannot account for clients’ vote choices in the Sertão of Bahia, Brazil, where voters were free to choose among competing candidates but supported patrons they knew were unreliable. This article argues that clients voluntarily voted for bad patrons as a strategy to gain symbolic power in their negotiations with politicians. By explaining clients’ paradoxical choices in the Sertão, this article reveals how clientelism can persist without monitoring mechanisms or positive attitudes toward patrons. In addition, this study shows the importance of incorporating voters’ perspectives and their everyday survival strategies to better account for clients’ political behavior.

当前在客户主义背景下的投票行为方法要么预测客户会因为担心自己的利益被切断而将他们的偏好放在一边，要么自愿支持他们认为是可靠赞助人的政客。这两种方法无法解释客户在巴西巴伊亚州 Sertão 的投票选择，那里的选民可以自由选择竞争候选人，但他们知道支持的赞助人是不可靠的。本文认为，客户自愿投票给坏顾客，以此作为在与政客谈判中获得象征性权力的策略。通过解释客户在 Sertão 中矛盾的选择，本文揭示了客户主义如何在没有监督机制或对顾客的积极态度的情况下持续存在。此外，