Leading cosmological theories engender a controversial puzzle which has prompted philosophers to propose competing epistemological solutions and physicists to propose methodological changes to cosmology. The puzzle arises from the prediction that every brain on Earth will eventually be vastly outnumbered by physical duplicates formed by random collisions of particles in outer space. Supposing that this prediction is correct, shouldn't you believe that your brain is probably one of these vastly more typical extraterrestrial brains, since you cannot infer your brain's origin from your experiential state? But supposing that your brain is one of these extraterrestrial brains, why be confident in the cosmological theories, since you never actually received testimony supporting these theories? Proposals in the literature either deny the rationality of believing theories that make the prediction or deny the typicality of your brain among its duplicates. This paper argues that these proposals are not entirely satisfactory. Instead, one should be confident in theories making the prediction on the supposition that your brain is one of the extraterrestrial brains. The upshots include that it may be rational to believe that your brain is probably an extraterrestrial brain and that cosmologists should not alter their methodology in response to the puzzle.

中文翻译：

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玻尔兹曼大脑之谜

领先的宇宙学理论引发了一个有争议的难题，促使哲学家提出相互竞争的认识论解决方案，物理学家提出宇宙学方法论的改变。这个谜题源于这样的预测：地球上每个大脑的数量最终将大大超过外太空粒子随机碰撞形成的物理复制品。假设这个预测是正确的，因为你无法从你的经验状态推断出你的大脑的起源，你难道不应该相信你的大脑可能是这些更典型的外星大脑之一吗？但是，假设你的大脑是这些外星大脑之一，为什么要对宇宙学理论充满信心，因为你从未真正收到过支持这些理论的证词呢？文献中的建议要么否认做出预测的相信理论的合理性，要么否认你的大脑在其复制品中的典型性。本文认为这些建议并不完全令人满意。相反，人们应该对基于你的大脑是外星大脑之一的假设进行预测的理论充满信心。结果包括，相信你的大脑可能是外星大脑可能是合理的，宇宙学家不应该改变他们的方法来应对这个难题。