Banning political parties is an extreme institutional measure that democracies tend to use sparingly. Nevertheless, Latin American countries frequently proscribe their parties through rules that activate dissolution for not reaching a certain number of votes or seats in an election. Such rules are expected to stabilize and simplify party systems. However, a competing theory suggests that such rules instead promote electoral volatility by injecting political uncertainty into the party system through cyclical refoundation of extinct parties and the mechanical effects of parties’ exits. Attempting to resolve this paradox, this analysis tests the effect of dissolution thresholds on electoral volatility in all Latin American democratic elections since 1980. Party bans based on dissolution thresholds are found to promote electoral volatility, which bears implications for democratic governance.

取缔政党是一种极端的制度措施，民主国家往往很少使用。然而，拉美国家经常通过在选举中未达到一定数量的选票或席位而激活解散的规则来禁止他们的政党。此类规则有望稳定和简化政党制度。然而，一种相互竞争的理论表明，此类规则反而会通过已灭绝政党的周期性重建和政党退出的机械效应，将政治不确定性注入政党体系，从而促进选举波动。为了解决这一悖论，本分析测试了自 1980 年以来所有拉丁美洲民主选举中解散门槛对选举波动的影响。发现基于解散门槛的政党禁令会促进选举波动，