How does the execution of horizontal accountability mechanisms affect cabinet members’ instability? This article analyzes distinct features of no-confidence motions (NCMs) in presidential systems, using a mixed-method research design that identifies elements of legislative control mechanisms in Peruvian and Colombian polities. Although the congress in presidential systems rarely approves NCMs, high salience policy shocks trigger their proposal, resulting in the dismissal or resignation of the cabinet member in question. Those results are subtle opportunities for opposition legislators to indicate the incompetence of the incumbent government in particular policy areas. This study contributes to understanding how contextual factors affect the effectiveness of the check and balance principle in presidential systems.

横向问责机制的执行如何影响内阁成员的不稳定？本文使用混合方法研究设计分析了总统制中不信任动议 (NCM) 的独特特征，该设计确定了秘鲁和哥伦比亚政体立法控制机制的要素。尽管总统制下的国会很少批准国家协调员，但高度显着的政策冲击会触发他们的提议，导致相关内阁成员被解职或辞职。这些结果为反对派立法者提供了表明现任政府在特定政策领域无能的微妙机会。这项研究有助于理解背景​​因素如何影响总统制制衡原则的有效性。