Because conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) can address the deep roots of violence, many scholars and policymakers have assumed them to be an effective and innocuous tool to take on the issue. I argue that while CCTs may have positive economic effects, they can also trigger social discord, criminal predation, and political conflict and, in doing so, increase violence. To test this claim, I take advantage of the exogenous shock caused by the randomized expansion of Mexico’s flagship CCT, PROGRESA/Oportunidades. I find that the experimental introduction of the program increased rather than decreased violence. Then, I analyze all the data compiled by LAPOP on the issue over the years. I find that, other things constant, Latin Americans are more exposed to violence and insecurity when they participate in CCTs than when they do not. These findings urge us to reconsider the effects of social programs on violence.

由于有条件现金转移计划（CCT）可以解决暴力的深层根源，许多学者和政策制定者认为它们是解决这一问题的有效且无害的工具。我认为，虽然有条件现金转移可能会产生积极的经济影响，但它们也可能引发社会不和、犯罪掠夺和政治冲突，从而增加暴力。为了检验这一说法，我利用了墨西哥旗舰 CCT PROGRESA/Oportunidades 的随机扩张所造成的外源性冲击。我发现该计划的实验性引入增加了而不是减少了暴力。然后，我分析了 LAPOP 多年来就该问题收集的所有数据。我发现，在其他条件不变的情况下，拉丁美洲人在参加有条件现金交易时比不参加时更容易遭受暴力和不安全感。