Philosophers have spent a great deal of time debating whether intransitive preferences can be rational. I present a risky decision that poses a challenge for the defender of intransitivity. The defender of intransitivity faces a trilemma and must either: (i) reject the rationality of intransitive preferences, (ii) deny State-wise Dominance, or (iii) accept the bizarre verdict that you can be required to pay to relabel the tickets of a fair lottery. If we take the first horn, then we have a synchronic refutation of intransitivity, an improvement on widely criticized diachronic arguments. I sketch possible responses that may rescue intransitivity and argue that each response is possible but generates an explanatory debt. I conclude by showing how the challenge here clarifies the foundations of decision theory without transitivity, conditional on some explanatory debt being payable.

中文翻译：

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不及物偏好的风险挑战

哲学家们花了很多时间争论不及物偏好是否可以是理性的。我提出了一个冒险的决定，它对不及物性的捍卫者提出了挑战。不及物性的捍卫者面临一个三难选择，必须：(i) 拒绝不及物性偏好的合理性，(ii) 否认国家主导，或 (iii) 接受奇怪的判决，即你可能需要支付费用才能重新标记一个公平的彩票。如果我们拿起第一个号角，那么我们就有了对不及物性的共时反驳，这是对广受批评的历时性的改进争论。我勾勒出可能挽救不及物性的可能反应，并论证每个反应都是可能的，但会产生解释性债务。最后，我展示了这里的挑战如何阐明没有传递性的决策理论的基础，条件是要支付一些解释性债务。