What is it to base a belief on reasons? Existing attempts to give an account of the basing relation encounter a dilemma: either one appeals to some kind of neutral process that does not adequately reflect the way basing is a content-sensitive first-personal activity, or one appeals to linking or bridge principles that over-intellectualize and threaten regress. We explain why this dilemma arises, and diagnose the commitments that are key obstacles to providing a satisfactory account. We explain why they should be rejected anyway, and then offer a new, knowledge-first virtue epistemological theory of the basing relation that shows how we can substantially theorize about mental processes without these commitments. The resulting view plausibly captures the way in which basing is an inherently mental and content-sensitive process.

中文翻译：

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乌龟应该做什么：基础关系的知识至上美德方法

什么是基于理由的信念？现有的解释基础关系的尝试遇到了一个困境：要么诉诸某种不能充分反映基础是一种内容敏感的第一人称活动的中性过程，要么诉诸链接或桥接原则过度智能化并威胁倒退。我们解释了为什么会出现这种困境，并诊断出提供令人满意的解释的主要障碍的承诺。我们解释了为什么它们无论如何都应该被拒绝，然后提供了一种新的、知识至上的美德认识论基础关系理论，该理论表明我们如何在没有这些承诺的情况下对心理过程进行实质性理论化。由此产生的观点合理地捕捉了基础是一种内在的心理和内容敏感过程的方式。