According to Michael Thompson's defence of neo-Aristotelian naturalism in meta-ethics, (i) ‘[t]he concept life-form is a pure or a priori, perhaps a logical, concept’, and (ii) ‘[t]he concept human, as we human beings have it, is an a priori concept’ (p. 57). Here I show Thompson's argument for (ii) to be unsound, hoping thereby to shed light on the neglected subject of the a prioricity of concepts more generally.

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什么时候概念是先验的？

根据迈克尔汤普森在元伦理学中对新亚里士多德自然主义的辩护，（i）“生命形式的概念是一个纯粹的或先验的，也许是逻辑的概念”，以及（ii）“他人类的概念，正如我们人类所拥有的那样，是一个先验概念”（第 57 页）。在这里，我展示汤普森关于 (ii) 的论证是不可靠的，希望借此更普遍地阐明概念的优先性这一被忽视的主题。