ABSTRACT

Almost every case of visual experience is as of a unified state of affairs and as of one or more specific particulars. I argue that a view on which the content of visual experience is a singular proposition, does a better job at explaining these two features of visual experience than three popular theories: the Complex Property Theory, Generalism, and Fregean Particularism. The defended view, however, entails that there are no visual hallucinations, traditionally understood. I make the case for the plausibility of this consequence.

中文翻译：

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独特的体验

摘要

几乎每一种视觉体验都是一种统一的事态和一个或多个具体细节。我认为，视觉体验的内容是单一命题的观点比三种流行的理论（复杂属性理论、普遍主义和弗雷格特殊主义）更好地解释了视觉体验的这两个特征。然而，被辩护的观点表明，不存在传统意义上的幻视。我证明了这个结果的合理性。