Is anything good simpliciter? And can things count as ‘good’ independent of the context in which ‘good’ is used? Traditionally, a number of meta-ethicists have given positive answers. But more recently, some philosophers have used observations based on natural language to argue that things can only count as ‘good’ relative to ends and contextual thresholds. I will use work from contemporary linguistics to argue that ‘good’ is ambiguous, and that it has a moral disambiguation that attributes a fixed degree of goodness. This implies that things can count as ‘good’ simpliciter, independent of context. Not only does this result provide support for the traditional view, but it also vindicates some aspects of the more recent view.

中文翻译：

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好人不如好刀

有什么好简单的吗？事物是否可以被视为“好”，而与使用“好”的上下文无关？传统上，许多元伦理学家都给出了肯定的答案。但最近，一些哲学家使用基于自然语言的观察来论证，只有相对于目的和上下文阈值，事物才能算作“好”。我将利用当代语言学的著作来论证“善”是模棱两可的，并且它具有道德消歧作用，可以归因于固定程度的善。这意味着事物可以更简单地被视为“好”，与上下文无关。这一结果不仅为传统观点提供了支持，而且还证实了最新观点的某些方面。