In 2013, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a database of consumer complaints filed against banks under its supervision (“CFPB banks”). We find that after the disclosure, rival banks exhibit a greater increase in mortgage approval rates in markets with more intensive mortgage complaints about CFPB banks. The effect is weaker when rivals have more expertise in the local market, are less concerned about credit risk due to mortgage sales, and locate in areas with more alternative information about the CFPB banks. The effect is concentrated in severe complaints and complaints related to loan underwriting practices. In addition to approving more loans, rivals also open more branches and are more likely to post a job opening in these markets. The findings suggest that these banks learn from the nonfinancial disclosures about operational deficiencies of peers (i.e., CFPB banks) in local markets, which alleviates their adverse selection concern about expanding.

中文翻译：

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向同行学习：消费者投诉披露的证据

2013年，美国消费者金融保护局发布了针对其监管的银行（“CFPB银行”）的消费者投诉数据库。我们发现，披露后，在对 CFPB 银行的抵押贷款投诉更为密集的市场中，竞争对手银行的抵押贷款批准率出现了更大的增长。当竞争对手在当地市场拥有更多专业知识、不太担心抵押贷款销售带来的信用风险、并且位于拥有更多关于 CFPB 银行的替代信息的地区时，这种影响就会减弱。其影响集中在严重投诉和与贷款承销做法相关的投诉上。除了批准更多贷款外，竞争对手还开设了更多分支机构，并且更有可能在这些市场上发布职位空缺。研究结果表明，这些银行从当地市场同行（即 CFPB 银行）运营缺陷的非财务披露中汲取教训，从而减轻了它们对扩张的逆向选择担忧。