We show that banks cross-sell future deposits and loans to existing household depositors. A bank is 20-percentage-points more likely to sell a loan to an existing depositor than to an otherwise comparable household. Existing depositors pay a premium when borrowing, and we find no indication that banks obtain an informational advantage on such borrowers, suggesting that the cross-selling is driven more by demand than by supply complementarities. These demand complementarities are in turn driven more by stickiness rather than by unobserved persistent preferences. Finally, banks internalize future cross-selling potential when setting deposit rates.

中文翻译：

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银行与家庭关系中的交叉销售：定价机制和影响

我们发现银行向现有家庭储户交叉销售未来的存款和贷款。银行向现有储户出售贷款的可能性比向其他类似家庭出售贷款的可能性高 20 个百分点。现有储户在借款时支付溢价，而且我们没有发现银行在此类借款人身上获得信息优势的迹象，这表明交叉销售更多地是由需求驱动的，而不是由供给互补性驱动的。这些需求互补性反过来更多地是由粘性驱动的，而不是由未被观察到的持久偏好驱动的。最后，银行在设定存款利率时将未来交叉销售的潜力内部化。