Extensive evidence suggests that managers strategically choose the complexity of their descriptive disclosures. However, their motives in doing so appear mixed, as complex disclosures are used to obfuscate in some cases and to provide information in others. Building on these observations, we first identify a novel stylized fact: disclosure complexity is non-monotonic in firm performance. We develop a model of disclosure complexity that incorporates the dual roles of complexity and can explain this stylized fact. In the model, a manager discloses to investors of heterogeneous sophistication and can adjust the complexity of the disclosure to either provide more precise information or to obfuscate. When the firm's investor base is largely unsophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure only upon observing negative news. In contrast, when the firm's investor base is more sophisticated, the manager issues a complex disclosure upon observing either highly positive or negative news. As a result, the market may react more positively to complex information releases than to simple releases, complex disclosures generate heightened return volatility, and firms with more inherently complex information are more likely to use their discretion to simplify their disclosures.

大量证据表明，管理者战略性地选择了描述性披露的复杂性。然而，他们这样做的动机似乎很复杂，因为复杂的披露在某些情况下被用来混淆视听，而在另一些情况下则被用来提供信息。基于这些观察，我们首先确定了一个新颖的事实：披露复杂性在公司绩效中是非单调的。我们开发了一个披露复杂性模型，该模型结合了复杂性的双重作用，并且可以解释这一典型事实。在该模型中，管理者向不同复杂程度的投资者进行披露，并可以调整披露的复杂性以提供更准确的信息或进行混淆。当公司的投资者基础大多不成熟时，经理只有在观察到负面消息时才会发布复杂的披露信息。相比之下，当公司的投资者基础更加复杂时，经理在观察到高度正面或负面的消息时会发布复杂的披露信息。因此，市场对复杂信息发布的反应可能比对简单信息发布的反应更积极，复杂的披露会导致回报波动性加大，而拥有更复杂信息的公司更有可能利用其自由裁量权来简化其披露。