There is some consensus on the claim that imagination as suppositional thinking can have epistemic value insofar as it's constrained by a principle of minimal alteration of how we know or believe reality to be – compatibly with the need to accommodate the supposition initiating the imaginative exercise. But in the philosophy of imagination there is no formally precise account of how exactly such minimal alteration is to work. I propose one. I focus on counterfactual imagination, arguing that this can be modeled as simulated belief revision governed by Laplacian imaging. So understood, it can be rationally justified by accuracy considerations: it minimizes expected belief inaccuracy, as measured by the Brier score.

中文翻译：

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“逻辑将带你从 A 到 B，想象力将带你去任何地方”

人们一致认为，作为假设性思维的想象力可以具有认知价值，因为它受到我们如何知道或相信现实的最小程度改变的原则的限制——与适应发起想象力练习的假设的需要相兼容。但在想象哲学中，对于这种最小的改变究竟是如何发挥作用的，并没有正式的精确说明。我建议一个。我专注于反事实想象，认为这可以建模为由拉普拉斯成像控制的模拟信念修正。如此理解，它可以通过准确性考虑来合理地证明：它最大限度地减少了预期的信念不准确性，如布赖尔分数所衡量。