According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies.

中文翻译：

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真实主义和怀疑主义

根据真实主义，你对普通物体存在的信念通常是真实的，并且可以构成知识，即使你处于某种全局怀疑的场景中。例如，即使您是笛卡尔恶魔的受害者，您仍然可以知道有桌子。因此，即使您不知道自己是否处于这种情况，您仍然知道有表。这驳斥了标准的怀疑论。但这是否解决了该论点带来的怀疑问题？我认为事实并非如此，因为根据真实主义，我们对外部世界的了解并不多于根据怀疑论的说法。相反，真实主义只是重新阐述了我们所拥有的少量知识。然后我对怀疑问题的本质得出一些一般性结论，