Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in the rescue decision. As rescuers, our primary duty is to respect these procedural claims, which we must do by doing what these people would decide, in a process where each is given an equal vote on the matter. So in cases where each votes in their own self-interest, respect for their equal right to decide, or their autonomy, will lead us to save the greater number. The argument is explained in detail, with special attention to the questions of how, exactly, it avoids aggregation, and of why majority rule is superior to lottery procedures. The view has further advantages. Especially, it explains the “partial” relevance of numbers in cases involving unequal harms, and it does so in a way that dissolves the appearance of paradox that besets theories of “partial aggregation.”

中文翻译：

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没有聚合的数字

假设我们可以拯救一大群人或一小群独特的人免受伤害。许多人认为，在其他条件相同的情况下，我们应该拯救更多的人。本文捍卫了这一观点（有条件）。但与早期的理论不同，它并不依赖于几个人的利益或主张得到更大的总权重的想法。争论的出发点是，由于受灾群众的利害关系，他们有权在救援决定中拥有发言权。作为救援人员，我们的首要职责是尊重这些程序性主张，我们必须按照这些人的决定行事来做到这一点，在这个过程中，每个人都对此事享有平等的投票权。因此，如果每个人都为了自己的利益而投票，尊重他们平等的决定权或自主权，将使我们拯救更多的人。对这一论点进行了详细解释，特别关注了它到底如何避免聚合以及为什么多数规则优于抽签程序的问题。该视图还有更多优点。特别是，它解释了涉及不平等伤害的案件中数字的“部分”相关性，并且它的方式消除了困扰“部分聚合”理论的悖论的出现。