Here, I take alethic views of understanding to be all views that hold that whether an explanation is true or false matters for whether that explanation provides understanding. I then argue that there is (as yet) no naturalistic defence of alethic views of understanding in cognitive science, because there is no agreement about the correct descriptions of the content of cognitive scientific explanations. I use this claim to argue for the provisional acceptance of afactivism in cognitive science, which is the view that the truth or falsity of an explanation of cognition is irrelevant to whether that explanation provides understanding. I conclude by discussing the relation between understanding in cognitive science and understanding in other domains.

在这里，我将理解的道德观点视为所有认为解释是真是假关系到该解释是否提供理解的观点。然后我认为，认知科学中的理解的道德观点（迄今为止）还没有自然主义的辩护，因为对于认知科学解释的内容的正确描述还没有达成一致。我用这个主张来论证认知科学中对非行动主义的暂时接受，即认知解释的真实或错误与该解释是否提供理解无关。最后，我讨论了认知科学的理解与其他领域的理解之间的关系。