Comparative cognitive science often involves asking questions like ‘Do nonhumans have C?’ where C is a capacity we take humans to have. These questions frequently generate unproductive disagreements, in which one party affirms and the other denies that nonhumans have the relevant capacity on the basis of the same evidence. I argue that these questions can be productively understood as questions about natural kinds: do nonhuman capacities fall into the same natural kinds as our own? Understanding such questions in this way has several advantages: it preserves the intuition that these are substantive empirical questions worth asking; it helps us to understand why they so frequently give rise to disagreements of the kind described; and it provides clues about how to diagnose and resolve them.

中文翻译：

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比较认知科学中的分歧和分类

比较认知科学经常涉及诸如“非人类有 C 吗？”之类的问题。其中 C 是我们认为人类具有的能力。这些问题经常会产生无益的分歧，其中一方基于相同的证据肯定非人类具有相关能力，而另一方则否认非人类具有相关能力。我认为这些问题可以有效地理解为关于自然类型的问题：非人类的能力是否属于与我们自己相同的自然类型？以这种方式理解这些问题有几个优点：它保留了这些是值得提出的实质性经验问题的直觉；它有助于我们理解为什么它们如此频繁地引起所描述的那种分歧；它提供了有关如何诊断和解决这些问题的线索。