We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Relaxing trading frictions can reduce welfare because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can help overcome collective action problems at the voting stage. We also analyze the role of index investors and social concerns of shareholders.

中文翻译：

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交易和股东民主

我们在交易影响股东基础构成的模型中研究股东投票。交易和投票是互补的，这会产生对提案接受和多重均衡的自我实现期望。价格和股东福利可以朝相反的方向变化，因此前者可能无法替代后者。放松交易摩擦可以减少福利，因为它可以让极端股东在投票中获得更多权重。将决策权委托给董事会有助于克服投票阶段的集体行动问题。我们还分析了指数投资者的作用和股东的社会关注。