In decentralized systems, citizens struggle to identify which level of government provides local goods. This problem is particularly salient in weakly institutionalized party environments, where politicians at different levels of government are less likely to benefit from partisan coattail effects. This article asks how citizens attribute credit for local public goods. I argue that citizens have a strong tendency to attribute credit to local politicians. As a result, citizens will respond differently to credit-claiming behavior by local and national politicians. Local politicians experience a ceiling effect, in which credit claiming has no effect on how citizens attribute credit. However, national politicians have no such ceiling and can claim credit to increase the likelihood that citizens will attribute credit to them. As a result, both political actors can receive credit for the same local goods. The article tests and supports these theoretical predictions using a vignette survey experiment in Colombia.

中文翻译：

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谁获得信用？公民对当地公共产品的反应

在分散的系统中，公民很难确定哪一级政府提供本地商品。这个问题在制度化薄弱的政党环境中尤为突出，各级政府的政客不太可能从党派效应中受益。本文询问公民如何对地方公共物品进行信用评价。我认为公民有强烈的倾向将功劳归功于当地政客。因此，公民对地方和国家政客的信用主张行为会有不同的反应。当地政客经历了天花板效应，即信用主张对公民如何归因信用没有影响。然而，国家政客没有这样的上限，可以通过声称获得荣誉来增加公民将功劳归于他们的可能性。结果，两个政治参与者都可以获得相同的当地商品的信贷。本文使用哥伦比亚的小插曲调查实验来测试并支持这些理论预测。