Decades of findings in psychology suggest that human belief is thoroughly irrational. At best, beliefs might be formed by heuristic processes that predictably lead to suboptimal outcomes. At worst, they are slaves to motivated reasoning, which allows people to come to whichever conclusions they prefer. In this article, we suggest that belief updating, narrowly construed, may be a rational process that is uniquely sensitive to evidence and cognitively impenetrable to desires or incentives. Before any updating can occur, however, a series of processes mediate between information in the world and subjectively compelling evidence. We distinguish between updating proper and processes of evidence search, acceptance, hypothesis specification, integration of relevant information, and reasoning. We review research highlighting the computational difficulty inherent to each of these problems and conclude that solutions must be heuristic and fallible. Beyond incidental failures, evidence evaluation processes-unlike updating-are penetrable to motivation and as such, may be biased by people's desires and goals. In light of this distinction, we propose a theoretical framework for integrating research on belief which divides the cognitive processes involved in belief into two distinct levels. At Level 1, updating is suggested to be approximately Bayesian and impenetrable to desires and goals. In contrast, Level 2 processes, which search for and evaluate evidence, are cognitively penetrable. In addition, we emphasize that Level 2 processes are necessarily heuristic and exhibit bounded rationality (Simon, 1956) given the difficulty of the problems they have to solve. Finally, we specify an additional set of relatively invariant characteristics, which influence how Level 2 processes are employed by making different methods of information processing available. Our framework offers a more nuanced understanding of belief, permits a granular localization of irrationality, and may help reconcile extant debates in the literature. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

中文翻译：

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更新、证据评估和操作员可用性：理解信念的理论框架。

几十年的心理学研究结果表明，人类的信念是完全不合理的。最好的情况是，信念可能是通过启发式过程形成的，而这些过程可预见地导致次优结果。在最坏的情况下，他们是动机推理的奴隶，这使得人们可以得出他们喜欢的任何结论。在本文中，我们认为狭义上的信念更新可能是一个对证据特别敏感的理性过程，而在认知上对欲望或激励是难以理解的。然而，在进行任何更新之前，需要在现实世界的信息和主观上令人信服的证据之间进行一系列的调解过程。我们区分正确的更新过程和证据搜索、接受、假设规范、相关信息的整合和推理的过程。我们回顾了强调每个问题固有的计算难度的研究，并得出结论，解决方案必须是启发式的且容易出错。除了偶然的失败之外，证据评估过程（与更新不同）是可以渗透到动机的，因此，可能会受到人们的愿望和目标的影响。鉴于这种区别，我们提出了一个整合信念研究的理论框架，该框架将信念涉及的认知过程分为两个不同的层次。在第 1 级，建议更新近似贝叶斯式，并且无法理解愿望和目标。相比之下，寻找和评估证据的 2 级流程在认知上是可渗透的。此外，我们强调，考虑到必须解决的问题的难度，2 级过程必然是启发式的，并且表现出有限理性（Simon，1956）。最后，我们指定了一组额外的相对不变的特征，这些特征通过提供不同的信息处理方法来影响 2 级流程的使用方式。我们的框架提供了对信仰更细致的理解，允许对非理性进行精细定位，并可能有助于协调文献中现有的争论。（PsycInfo 数据库记录 (c) 2023 APA，保留所有权利）。