Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes, widely understudied, carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers. But under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the executive–legislative bargaining process. After a discussion of whether partial vetoes are a proactive legislative tool or a bargaining tool to induce executive–legislative cooperation, we test four hypotheses using the 2,346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage. We identified 97 partial vetoes (4.2 percent) and one total veto. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more complex legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one chamber, but more popular presidents do not veto more bills. As most presidential vetoes in Chile are partial, they are an additional executive–legislative bargaining step in the lawmaking process rather than evidence of hyperpresidentialism.

中文翻译：

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总统的部分否决权和行政立法谈判：智利，1990-2018 年

总统否决权被定义为一种可信的威胁，可以加强行政部门的讨价还价地位，但并未得到广泛研究，它带有国家权力之间对抗的耻辱。但在某些制度设置下，部分否决权可以成为行政立法谈判过程中的一个额外步骤。在讨论部分否决权是主动立法工具还是诱导行政立法合作的讨价还价工具之后，我们使用智利 1990 年至 2018 年间提出的 2,346 项达到可否决阶段的法案检验了四个假设。我们确定了 97 项部分否决权（4.2%）和 1 项全部否决权。当总统在至少一个议院获得更强有力的支持时，他们更有可能否决具有更复杂立法程序的法案，但更受欢迎的总统不会否决更多法案。由于智利的大多数总统否决权都是片面的，因此它们是立法过程中额外的行政立法谈判步骤，而不是超级总统主义的证据。