Abstract

Animalism is the doctrine that you and I are animals. Like any substantive philosophical position, animalism faces objections. For example, imagine a case of conjoined twins, where there are two heads, but only one “body,” and where each head seems to have its own typically human and fully discrete mental life. It would be natural to assume that each of the twins is a thing like you and me—each twin is one of us. But it appears that each twin cannot be a distinct human animal, since it appears in this case that there is only one animal. So it appears that animalism renders the wrong verdict in this case. I present two responses to this worry, drawing on Aristotelian claims about the centrality of sensation to animals, and on an account of organism-hood from Maureen and Samuel Condic. I close by considering craniopagus parasiticus and cephalopagus, and show the Aristotelian response is effective in such cases as well.

中文翻译：

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异形动物主义和连体双胞胎

摘要

动物主义是你我都是动物的学说。与任何实质性的哲学立场一样，动物主义也面临着反对。例如，想象一个连体双胞胎的例子，其中有两个头，但只有一个“身体”，并且每个头似乎都有自己典型的人类和完全离散的精神生活。我们很自然地会假设双胞胎中的每一个都像你和我一样——每一个双胞胎都是我们中的一员。但似乎每对双胞胎都不可能是不同的人类动物，因为在这种情况下，似乎只有一种动物。由此可见，动物主义在本案中做出了错误的判决。我对这种担忧提出了两种回应，借鉴了亚里士多德关于动物感觉的中心地位的主张，以及莫琳和塞缪尔·康迪克对有机体的解释。最后，我考虑了寄生颅骨和头颅，并表明亚里士多德的反应在这种情况下也是有效的。