We analyze how interdependencies in financial networks can lead to self-fulfilling insolvencies and multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. Multiplicity arises if a certain type of dependency cycle exists in the network. We show that finding the cheapest bailout policy that prevents self-fulfilling insolvencies is computationally hard, but that the optimal policy has intuitive features in some typical network structures. Leveraging indirect benefits ensures systemic solvency at a cost that never exceeds half of the overall shortfall. In core-periphery networks, it is optimal to bail out peripheral banks first as opposed to core banks.

中文翻译：

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金融网络中的信贷冻结、均衡多重性和最优救助

我们分析金融网络中的相互依赖性如何导致自我实现的破产和多种可能的均衡结果。如果网络中存在某种类型的依赖循环，就会出现多重性。我们表明，找到防止自我实现破产的最便宜的救助政策在计算上是困难的，但最优政策在一些典型的网络结构中具有直观的特征。利用间接效益确保系统性偿付能力，而成本绝不会超过总体缺口的一半。在核心-外围网络中，最好首先救助外围银行，而不是核心银行。