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Epistemic Arguments for a Democratic Right to Silence
The Philosophical Quarterly Pub Date : 2024-01-19 , DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqad128
Dan Degerman 1 , Francesca Bellazzi 1, 2
Affiliation  

While much ink has been spilt over the political importance of speech, much less has been dedicated to the political importance of silence. This article seeks to fill that gap. We propose the need for a robust, democratic right to silence in public life and argue that there are politically salient epistemic reasons for recognising that right. We begin by defining what silence is and what a robust right to silence entails. We then argue that the right to silence offers two politically salient epistemic benefits. The first is that, if the right to silence is maintained, we can avoid the epistemic harm that may be caused when an individual is compelled to lie in public. The second is that the right to silence can protect marginalised individuals against the epistemic injustices that may arise when others are likely to misconstrue their speech.

中文翻译:

支持民主沉默权的认知论点

尽管人们对言论的政治重要性进行了很多论述,但对沉默的政治重要性的关注却少之又少。本文旨在填补这一空白。我们提出需要在公共生活中建立强有力的、民主的沉默权,并认为承认这一权利有政治上显着的认知理由。我们首先定义什么是沉默以及强有力的沉默权意味着什么。然后我们认为,沉默权提供了两个政治上显着的认知益处。首先,如果保持沉默权,我们就可以避免个人被迫在公共场合撒谎时可能造成的认知伤害。第二,沉默权可以保护边缘化个人免受当其他人可能误解他们的言论时可能出现的认知不公正。
更新日期:2024-01-19
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