Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory must claim, then it seems that you could be made arbitrarily well off by being given enough of that good even if your life is hedonically terrible. My aim is to defend pluralistic theories against this objection. After replying to the simplest version of it, I will answer a more sophisticated version of it that has recently been leveled by Theron Pummer.

中文翻译：

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关于幸福的快乐、痛苦和多元主义

多元的幸福理论似乎无法解释快乐和痛苦对于幸福的重要性。直觉上，如果你的生活在享乐方面足够糟糕（例如，因为你从未感到任何快乐，并且你在无情的痛苦中度过了两年），那么你的生活对你来说是有限的。但如果存在某种不同于快乐的基本善，就像任何多元理论都必须主张的那样，那么即使你的生活在享乐上很糟糕，你似乎也可以通过获得足够的这种善而变得任意富裕。我的目的是捍卫多元理论，反对这种反对意见。在回答完最简单的版本后，我将回答最近由 Theron Pummer 升级的更复杂的版本。