We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.

中文翻译：

---

贷款标准的动态理论1

我们分析了一个动态的信贷市场，银行选择贷款标准，模拟为筛选不良借款人的昂贵努力。更严格的标准使借款人群体更加恶化，从而增加了银行未来采用更严格标准的动力。贷款标准的这种动态互补性可能会放大和延长经济衰退，减少贷款并增加信用利差。由于贷款标准具有负外部性，市场可以在贷款标准收紧且效率低下的情况下趋于稳定状态。我们讨论了避免这种结果的最优政策的作用以及资产负债表成本对贷款标准的影响。