This paper proposes a sufficientarian theory with an interval of sufficiency levels. I assume that there are upper and lower bounds of sufficiency and that all well-being levels in between can be considered sufficiency levels. This interval reflects the vagueness of the concept of sufficiency. According to the proposed principle, a distribution is morally better than another if and only if, for each threshold within the interval, the headcount of those below the threshold under the former distribution is smaller than that under the latter distribution. This necessarily leads to incommensurability in moral relations. I argue that such incommensurability makes sufficientarian principles invulnerable to some fundamental objections.

本文提出了一种具有充足水平区间的充足理论。我假设充足性有上限和下限，并且介于两者之间的所有幸福水平都可以被视为充足水平。这个区间反映了充足性概念的模糊性。根据所提出的原则，当且仅当对于区间内的每个阈值，前一种分配下低于阈值的人数少于后一种分配下的人数时，一种分配在道德上优于另一种分配。这必然导致道德关系的不可通约性。我认为，这种不可通约性使得充分论原则不会受到一些根本性反对的影响。