Theories of crisis bargaining suggest that costly signals can enhance the credibility of one’s coercive threats. In particular, engaging in conspicuous military mobilizations or demonstrations of force are thought to communicate one’s resolve in a crisis. Yet, there is disagreement about why this might be the case. One set of theories emphasizes the hand-tying political and reputational effects of visible military action. A different collection of theories argues that mobilizations create bargaining leverage by shifting the balance of power in favor of the mobilizing side. This article uses new data on coercive threats in international crises to discriminate between these two explanations. It makes two key contributions. First, it presents systematic evidence that military mobilizations during a crisis bolster the effectiveness of compellent threats. Second, it demonstrates that such signals are likely effective because they alter the local balance of military power, not because of their political effects.

中文翻译：

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在危机谈判中通过军事信号进行束缚

危机讨价还价理论表明，代价高昂的信号可以提高强制威胁的可信度。特别是，进行引人注目的军事动员或武力展示被认为可以传达一个人在危机中的决心。然而，对于为什么会出现这种情况，存在分歧。一组理论强调可见的军事行动对政治和声誉的束缚。一系列不同的理论认为，动员通过将权力平衡转向有利于动员方的方式来创造讨价还价的杠杆。本文使用有关国际危机中强制威胁的新数据来区分这两种解释。它做出了两个关键贡献。首先，它提供了系统的证据，表明危机期间的军事动员增强了强制性威胁的有效性。其次，它表明这些信号之所以有效，可能是因为它们改变了当地的军事力量平衡，而不是因为它们的政治影响。