How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Leaders’ differentiated ties by degree—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies’ access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I re-examine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While necessary and successful, these crisis management policies reinforce global hierarchies and exacerbate the democratic deficit in central banking. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic foundations of the global financial safety net.

中文翻译：

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危机中的央行行长：2008 年全球金融危机期间的人际信任、合作以及美联储互换网络的创建

政策制定者如何应对全球危机？我认为，人际信任使政策制定者能够在危机和不确定的情况下进行临时合作。 2008 年全球金融危机期间，领导人的不同程度的关系（更强、更松散或缺乏）影响了各经济体获得美联储互换额度的机会，而不是成本更高的单边和多边替代方案。利用这个框架，我重新审视了美联储互换网络的出现。我对危机期间在任央行行长的精英访谈以及美联储会议记录中的证据进行了三角分析。我的研究结果强调了人际信任作为操作变量在塑造国际合作模式中的作用，并提出了技术官僚治理的政治问题。虽然这些危机管理政策是必要且成功的，但它们强化了全球等级制度，并加剧了中央银行的民主赤字。因此，本文提请人们关注全球金融安全网的有争议和不民主的基础。