This study examines the effect of the overconfidence of chief executive officers (CEOs) on the informativeness of banks' stock prices. Using an option-based overconfidence measure, we demonstrate that banks with overconfident CEOs have less informative stock prices. This finding is robust to alternative measures of overconfident CEOs and to addressing endogeneity with propensity score matching, an instrumental variable approach, and difference-in-differences analysis. Furthermore, banking and financial market crises strengthen the negative effect of overconfident CEOs on stock price informativeness, especially in larger banks. Finally, better corporate governance or higher capital mitigates the negative impact of overconfident CEOs on banks' stock price informativeness. Policymakers should consider implementing supervisory strategies that require banks to provide accurate information and encourage private-sector monitoring of banks.

中文翻译：

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CEO过度自信与银行股价的信息量


本研究探讨了首席执行官 (CEO) 的过度自信对银行股价信息性的影响。使用基于期权的过度自信衡量标准，我们证明首席执行官过度自信的银行的股价信息量较少。这一发现对于过度自信的首席执行官的替代衡量标准以及通过倾向得分匹配、工具变量方法和双重差异分析解决内生性问题都是强有力的。此外，银行和金融市场危机加剧了首席执行官过度自信对股价信息性的负面影响，尤其是在大型银行中。最后，更好的公司治理或更高的资本可以减轻首席执行官过度自信对银行股价信息性的负面影响。政策制定者应考虑实施监管战略，要求银行提供准确信息并鼓励私营部门对银行进行监管。