According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we believe only indirectly. This paper argues that Kierkegaard does in fact endorse a restricted, sophisticated, and plausible version of direct doxastic voluntarism. On Kierkegaard's view, when we take ourselves to be in an epistemically permissive situation, we have the ability to form outright beliefs (but not credences) at will in virtue of our ability to voluntarily 1) open or close inquiry and 2) determine our attitude towards epistemic risk.

中文翻译：

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决心相信：克尔凯郭尔的直接唯意志主义

根据克尔凯郭尔的传统解释，他赞同一种强烈的直接唯意志主义形式，在这种形式上，我们可以通过意志的蛮力，做出“信仰的飞跃”，去相信我们自己认为不可能和荒谬的命题。然而，大多数克尔凯郭尔领先学者现在完全拒绝这种解读，而是将克尔凯郭尔解释为认为意志只能间接影响我们的信念。本文认为，克尔凯郭尔实际上赞同一种受限制的、复杂的、合理的直接唯意志主义版本。在克尔凯郭尔看来，当我们认为自己处于一种认知上允许的情况时，我们就有能力随意形成彻底的信念（但不是信任），因为我们有能力自愿地1）开放或结束探究以及2）决定我们的态度朝向认知风险。