This paper is concerned with the security issue of remote state estimation in multi-systems. Note that different subsystems or local state information possess varying levels of importance. A novel denial-of-service (DoS) attack type, referred to as a subsystem-importance-aware DoS attack, is proposed. The importance of a subsystem refers to the quantitative impact of its information on the correctness or accuracy of decision-making for the entire system. Here, the importance of a subsystem is positively correlated with the power allocated to transmit local information. Additionally, it is assumed that the attacker has access to the transmission power of all subsystems. The optimal attack strategies are then investigated under different subsystem-importance weight functions and the error functions that are related to the packet arrival rate, and the closed-form solutions under some special cases are provided. Furthermore, potential defense strategies are investigated, leveraging the gap in the interpretation of the subsystem importance between the attacker and the defender, formulated as a Stackelberg game. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the theoretical results and provide insights into possible countermeasures against our proposed attack.

中文翻译：

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子系统重要性感知的 DoS 攻击和对策

本文关注多系统中远程状态估计的安全问题。请注意，不同的子系统或本地状态信息具有不同的重要性级别。提出了一种新型拒绝服务 (DoS) 攻击类型，称为子系统重要性感知 DoS 攻击。子系统的重要性是指其信息对整个系统决策的正确性或准确性的定量影响。这里，子系统的重要性与分配用于传输本地信息的功率正相关。此外，假设攻击者可以访问所有子系统的传输功率。然后研究了不同子系统重要性权重函数和与数据包到达率相关的误差函数下的最优攻击策略，并提供了一些特殊情况下的封闭式解决方案。此外，还研究了潜在的防御策略，利用攻击者和防御者之间对子系统重要性的解释上的差距，将其制定为 Stackelberg 博弈。最后，提供了数值示例来说明理论结果，并提供针对我们提出的攻击的可能对策的见解。