In this paper, we study the coordination of a dual sourcing supply chain comprising a buyer and two suppliers: a regular and an expedited one. The suppliers differ in lead time and cost, with the expedited supplier offering a shorter lead time at a higher cost than the regular supplier. The buyer uses the Tailored Base-Surge inventory policy, ordering every period a fixed quantity from the regular supplier and using the expedited supplier to meet any excess demand. We employ a novel perspective by assuming that each of the three firms is an independent party optimizing its profit function. We consider two scenarios: in the first scenario, the expedited supplier acts as a spot market, resulting in a two-players game between the buyer and regular supplier. The second scenario considers a three-players game. We derive the conditions for coordination for both scenarios, which we refer to as single and double coordination, and explore the impact of various parameters on the games and coordination. Our findings reveal that in the two-players scenario, regular orders increase with the spot market price, with a greater increase under coordination. Meanwhile, in the three-players scenario, equilibrium can only be sustained by increasing the order quantity from the expedited supplier in case its sourcing cost increases. Moreover, the regular supplier has an incentive to raise its price, whereas the expedited supplier charges a fixed price to the buyer. However, coordination results in the buyer placing fewer expedited orders. We demonstrate that the regular supplier sets its price just below the expedited supplier’s price. In contrast, the expedited supplier acts more aggressively in setting its price to either eliminate the regular supplier or charge the maximum possible price.

中文翻译：

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定制基础-激增政策下双采购系统中的供应链协调

在本文中，我们研究了由买方和两个供应商（常规供应商和加急供应商）组成的双重采购供应链的协调。供应商的交货时间和成本各不相同，加急供应商的交货时间比常规供应商短，但成本较高。买方使用定制的基本-激增库存政策，每个时期从常规供应商处订购固定数量，并使用加急供应商来满足任何过剩需求。我们采用了一种新颖的视角，假设这三个公司都是独立的一方，优化其利润函数。我们考虑两种情况：第一种情况是，加急供应商充当现货市场，导致买方和常规供应商之间形成二人博弈。第二种场景考虑三人游戏。我们推导了两种场景的协调条件，即单协调和双协调，并探讨了各种参数对博弈和协调的影响。我们的研究结果表明，在两人情景下，常规订单随着现货市场价格的增加而增加，并且在协调下增加幅度更大。同时，在三人情景下，只有增加加急供应商的订单数量才能维持均衡，以免其采购成本增加。此外，常规供应商有动力提高价格，而加急供应商则向买方收取固定价格。然而，协调会导致买方下的加急订单减少。我们证明常规供应商将其价格设定为略低于加急供应商的价格。相比之下，加急供应商在定价时表现得更加积极，要么淘汰常规供应商，要么收取尽可能高的价格。