Access control encryption enables access control on both senders and receivers, and enhances message sanitization compared with traditionally cryptographic access control mechanisms. However, it is usually built on top of encrypted messages, which makes it difficult to identify malicious data and amplifies abusive message transmission. Message franking and source tracing mechanisms facilitate a report of abusive messages while support only plain-data moderation in end-to-end encryption. In this work, we present sMAC, a purified access control framework which supports both sanitization and moderation over the encrypted messages. It enables security of the data privacy, sender anonymity and backward security. We instantiate it by proposing a cryptographic primitive named amenable ACE, which expands the message accountability algorithm module in addition to access control encryption. We give formal security proof of amenable ACE in the standard model. The experimental results show that amenable ACE is efficient where computational costs of $\textsf {Decrypt}$ , $\textsf {Stamp}$ , $\textsf {Verify}$ and $\textsf {Inspect}$ are independent of the message size.

中文翻译：

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具有加密消息审核的纯化授权服务

与传统的加密访问控制机制相比，访问控制加密可以对发送者和接收者进行访问控制，并增强消息清理能力。然而，它通常建立在加密消息之上，这使得识别恶意数据变得困难，并放大了滥用消息的传输。消息盖印和来源追踪机制有助于报告滥用消息，同时仅支持端到端加密中的纯数据审核。在这项工作中，我们提出了 sMAC，这是一种纯化的访问控制框架，它支持对加密消息的清理和审核。它实现了数据隐私、发送者匿名和后向安全的安全。我们通过提出一个名为 amenable ACE 的加密原语来实例化它，它除了访问控制加密之外还扩展了消息问责算法模块。我们在标准模型中给出了可接受的 ACE 的正式安全证明。实验结果表明，当计算成本为 $\textsf {解密}$ , $\textsf {图章}$ , $\textsf {验证}$和 $\textsf {检查}$与消息大小无关。