Recent research shows that while the creditors’ interests determine an issuer’s hedging policy, creditors observe incomplete information regarding the cash flow. This study examines hedging effects with incomplete information through a real-option model, thereby deriving associated implications. We show that the difference in firm values between hedged and unhedged policies increases with more incomplete information. The higher the hedging efficiency, the larger the difference in hedging values across the degrees of incomplete information. The hedging effect decreases with shareholders’ bargaining power in renegotiations. Our findings imply that creditors are more likely to impose hedging requirements when facing more incomplete information.

中文翻译：

---

不完整信息对风险管理的影响

最近的研究表明，虽然债权人的利益决定了发行人的对冲政策，但债权人观察到的有关现金流的信息不完整。本研究通过实物期权模型检验不完整信息的对冲效应，从而得出相关含义。我们表明，对冲和非对冲保单之间的公司价值差异随着不完整信息的增加而增加。套期保值效率越高，不同信息不完全程度的套期价值差异越大。套期保值效果随着股东在重新谈判中的议价能力而减弱。我们的研究结果表明，债权人在面对更多不完整信息时更有可能提出对冲要求。