Humean arguments from evil are some of the most powerful arguments against Theism. They take as their data what we know about good and evil. And they argue that some rival to Theism better explains, or otherwise predicts, that data than Theism. However, this paper argues that there are many problems with various methods for defending Humean arguments. I consider Philo’s original strategy; modern strategies in terms of epistemic probability; phenomenological strategies; and strategies that appeal to scientific and metaphysical explanations. None of these methods have been sufficiently developed to provide a clear and distinctive defense of Humean arguments. Defenders of Humean arguments need to spend more time on the underlying methodology of their arguments.

休谟关于邪恶的论证是反对有神论的最有力的论证之一。他们将我们所知道的善与恶作为他们的数据。他们认为，有神论的一些竞争对手比有神论更好地解释或预测了这些数据。然而，本文认为，捍卫休谟论证的各种方法都存在许多问题。我考虑了菲洛最初的策略；认知概率方面的现代策略；现象学策略；以及诉诸科学和形而上学解释的策略。这些方法都还没有得到充分发展，无法为休谟论证提供清晰而独特的辩护。休谟论证的捍卫者需要花更多时间研究其论证的基本方法论。