There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference, i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other issues (e.g. Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977; Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, 1978; Sainsbury in Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015; Sainsbury, Thinking about things, Oxford University Press, 2018), yet these authors provide no sustained discussion of it. Devitt (Designation, Columbia University Press, 1981) did formulate a view on which semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, yet his views are assimilated to causalist views. This is a mistake. While the conventionalized speaker’s reference view captures much of what is plausible in descriptivism and causalism, it remains distinct from both.

有一个简单、直观的专有名称语义参考理论，但被不公正地忽视了。这是一种观点，即语义指称是约定的说话者指称，即当且仅当存在使用名称来指称该对象的约定时，名称在语义上指代一个对象。该理论可以在主要处理其他问题的著作中找到（例如Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977；Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, 1978；Sainsbury in Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015；Sainsbury, 《思考事物》，牛津大学出版社，2018），但这些作者没有对此进行持续的讨论。 Devitt（Designation，哥伦比亚大学出版社，1981）确实提出了一种观点，即语义指称是约定的说话者的指称，但他的观点被同化为因果论观点。这是个错误。虽然传统说话者的参考观点捕捉到了描述主义和因果论中的大部分合理内容，但它仍然与两者不同。