Abstract
While dissent is key to successful science, it is not always beneficial. By requiring scientists to respond to objections, epistemically detrimental dissent (EDD) consumes resources that could be better devoted to furthering scientific discovery. Moreover, bad-faith dissent can create a chilling effect on certain lines of inquiry and make settled controversies seem open to debate. Such dissent results in harm to scientific progress and the public policy that depends on this science. Biddle and Leuschner propose four criteria that draw on inductive risk as a method for separating this EDD from beneficial dissent while de Melo-Martín and Intemann reject this approach for failing to capture paradigmatic instances of EDD. Against de Melo-Martín and Intemann’s objections, I propose the inductive risk account can be saved and strengthened through the following modifications: (1) removing the requirement that the four conditions of EDD be jointly satisfied, (2) requiring that each criterion be measured as a matter of degree rather than as a binary, and (3) requiring that the four criteria are measured holistically. These modifications not only mitigate the criticisms but produce five benefits over Biddle and Leuschner’s account, including: (1) capturing paradigmatic instances of EDD, (2) reflecting the degree to which an instance of EDD is problematic, (3) capturing the interactions between criteria, (4) avoiding legitimizing inappropriate dissent, and (5) reflecting changes to the epistemic standing of dissent. As such, I argue that the modified IndRA provides a powerful tool for identifying EDD and strengthening science.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
Not applicable.
Notes
de Melo-Martín and Intemann’s critiques of EDD are part of a larger project developing a notion of “normatively inappropriate dissent” (NID). While there may be subtle differences between NID and EDD, as my paper is focused on the viability of Biddle and Leuschner’s account, I will use the term “EDD” to ensure accuracy.
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for bringing this to my attention.
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer of this journal for raising this concern.
References
Biddle, J. B., & Leuschner, A. (2015). Climate skepticism and the manufacture of doubt: Can dissent in science be epistemically detrimental? European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 5(3), 261–278.
Botzen, W. J. W., Van Den, J. C. J. M., & Bergh (2009). Managing natural disaster risks in a changing climate. Environmental Hazards, 8(3), 209–225.
de Melo-Martín, I., & Intemann, K. (2018). The fight against doubt: How to bridge the gap between scientists and the public. Oxford University Press.
Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559–579.
Elliott, K. C., & Richards, T. (2017). Exploring inductive risk: Case studies of values in science. Oxford University Press.
Leuschner, A. (2018). Is it appropriate to ‘target’ inappropriate dissent? On the normative consequences of climate skepticism. Synthese, 195, 1255–1271.
Mann, M. E. (2013). The hockey stick and the climate wars: Dispatches from the front lines. Columbia University Press.
Mann, M. E., Raymond, S., Bradley, & Malcolm, K. H. (1998). Global-scale temperature patterns and climate forcing over the past six centuries. Nature, 392(6678), 779–787.
McIntyre, S., & McKitrick, R. (2005). Hockey sticks, principal components, and spurious significance. Geophysical Research Letters, 32(3).
McInytre, S., & McKitrick, R. (2003). Corrections to Mann et al. 1998 proxy data base and northern hemisphere average temperatures series. Energy & Environment, 14, 751–771.
Miller, B. (2021). When is Scientific Dissent epistemically Inappropriate? Philosophy of Science, 88(5), 918–928. https://doi.org/10.1086/714854
National Research Council. (2006). Surface temperature reconstructions for the last 2,000 years. The National Academies Press.
Newkirk, R. T. (2001). The increasing cost of disasters in developed countries: A challenge to local planning and government. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 9(3), 159–170.
Oreskes, N., & Conway, E. M. (2010). Merchants of doubt: How a handful of scientists obscured the truth on issues from Tobacco smoke to global warming (1st U.S. ed.). Bloomsbury Press.
Rudner, R. (1953). The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. Philosophy of Science, 20(1), 1–6.
Shukla, P. R., Skeg, J., Buendia, E. C., Valérie, Masson-Delmotte, H. O., Pörtner, D. C., Roberts, P., Zhai, R., Slade, S., Connors, & Van Diemen, S. (2019). Climate change and land: An IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems.
Solomon, M. (2007). Social empiricism. MIT Press.
Acknowledgements
My thanks to Tina Strasbourg and Ingo Brigandt for their feedback and support.
Funding
Not applicable.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
TP is the sole contributor to this manuscript.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Ethical approval
Not applicable.
Informed consent
Not applicable.
Conflict of interest
There are no known conflicts of interest.
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Paetkau, T. Inductive risk and epistemically detrimental dissent in policy-relevant science. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 14, 1 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00565-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00565-2