Studies show that cash transfer programs increase incumbent approval through their financial impact and clear association with the executive. But does this effect hold when it is the legislature rather than the incumbent proposing the program? Amid the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, more than 60 million Brazilians received an emergency assistance payment that was proposed by Congress against resistance from the executive. This study leverages this unique case to examine if cash transfer programs affect presidential approval under circumstances of unclear responsibility. Survey results showed that while approval ratings increased, the public was divided about who was responsible for the program. Moreover, a survey-experiment that informed respondents about the negotiations between the president and Congress found that information improves views about Congress but does not affect presidential approval. The results suggest that even cash transfer programs may promote limited vertical accountability in contexts of unclear policy responsibility.

研究表明，现金转移计划通过其财务影响以及与行政人员的明确联系来提高现任者的认可度。但是，当立法机构而不是现任者提出该计划时，这种效应是否成立？在 2020 年 COVID-19 大流行期间，超过 6000 万巴西人收到了国会不顾行政部门的抵制而提议的紧急援助金。本研究利用这一独特案例来检验现金转移计划是否会在责任不明确的情况下影响总统的批准。调查结果显示，虽然支持率有所上升，但公众对于谁负责该计划存在分歧。此外，一项向受访者通报总统与国会之间谈判情况的调查实验发现，这些信息可以改善人们对国会的看法，但不会影响总统的批准。结果表明，即使是现金转移计划也可能在政策责任不明确的情况下促进有限的纵向问责。