Given the significant exculpatory power that ignorance has when it comes to moral, legal, and epistemic transgressions, it is important to have an accurate understanding of the concept of ignorance. According to the Standard View of factual ignorance, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not know that p, while on the New View, a person is ignorant that p whenever they do not truly believe that p. On their own though, neither of these accounts explains how ignorance can often be a degreed notion—how we can sometimes be slightly ignorant, quite ignorant, or completely ignorant that p. In this paper, I will argue that there is a route for advocates of the Standard View and the New View to accommodate the gradability of ignorance. On the view I defend, ‘ignorant’ picks out everyone that is ignorant to some degree, making it possible that ignorance can be both degreed and characterized as a lack of knowledge or true belief. Even though we can be ignorant to a greater or lesser extent, the only way to avoid being ignorant that p is to know or truly believe.

鉴于无知在道德、法律和认识上的违法行为方面具有重要的开脱罪责的能力，因此准确理解无知的概念非常重要。根据事实无知的标准观点，当一个人不知道 p 时，他就对p不知道；而根据新观点，当一个人不真正相信p时，他就对p不知道。然而，就其本身而言，这些解释都没有解释无知如何常常是一个有程度的概念——我们有时如何可以稍微无知、完全无知或完全无知p。在本文中，我将论证标准观点和新观点的倡​​导者有一条途径来适应无知的等级。根据我所捍卫的观点，“无知”指的是每个在某种程度上无知的人，这使得无知可以被分为不同程度，也可以被描述为缺乏知识或真正的信仰。尽管我们可能或多或少地无知，但避免对p无知的唯一方法是了解或真正相信。